The Copenhagen political criteria have
Introduction
Turkey, in the process of accession to the EU, has been struggling with improving its human rights records, in which the minority-related matters have occupied an important accomplishing the latter aim, the main tool for the analysis will be the regular (progress) reports, which have been issued and released by the European Commission annually since 1998.
Through presenting some observations on the application of the conditionality to Turkey by the EU (Commission), it may be possible to predict which of two ways the EU is about to incline on the issue of minority protection (and rights). The two ways here refers to what Professor Bruno De Witte (2000, s. 21-22; 2004, s. 109-110) had put forward long ago on the future (possible) directions awaiting the EU on the issue of minority protection, in that he proposed that after the accession of the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) to the EU on 1 May 2004, EU's concern with minority protection would lead it to face with two possible scenarios or directions: spill-over scenario and status quo scenario.
According to the former scenario, the accession of the CEECs to the EU would lead the EU to adopt internal standards or to take measures on minority protection, while according to the latter one, the accession of the CEECs would not give rise to any changes in EU law concerning minority protection; therefore, the status quo -which basically meant that minority matters would fall within the competence of each member state rather than the EU's institutional capacity -would be maintained. In this respect, the assessment of which of the two scenarios is currently at play at the EU's internal level can be grasped -at least it can be traced-through observing the EU Commission's application of the conditionality to Turkey.
Before embarking on the analysis of the Reports, a brief introduction to what the conditionality means to the EU should be untangled. To do so, it is necessary to outline under what sort of circumstances the conditionality was formulated and what was the underlying motivations of the EU in adopting and introducing it. In addition to this, it is also essential to outline the EU law that, one way or another, deal with minority protection. By doing so, it may provide us with a normative basis for measuring the compliance of Turkey with the conditionality and general tendency of the EU towards the issue at stake.
After all, the Progress Reports issued on Turkey will be briefly taken up. In doing so, the focus -as the scope of the paper is limited-will be on the certain issues, mainly on the definition problem of minorities as employed in the Regular Progress Reports. Following this, the limits of the conditionality as an EU membership criterion will be identified with a view to shedding light on the future potential impacts of this criterion.
However, it should be mentioned at the outset that the EU is not the only actor that has an impact on the issues of human rights and minority protection in Turkey. The Council of Europe's (CoE) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) mechanisms and standards also play roles. Moreover, the EU conditionality, that is the Copenhagen criteria, has been highly influenced by the latter two organisations' efforts on the same subjects. Therefore, it is important to consider the efforts of the latter two European organisations on minority protection. Especially, the efforts of the CoE in developing the minority protection standards shall be taken into account for two reasons. 
EU's Concern with Minority Protection
A brief history of the minority concern of the EU, the CoE and the OSCE What lied behind the adoption of the conditionality of minority protection and what were its underlying motivations and rationales will be uncovered below.
Before going into the details, it should be noted that the history of the conditionality in particular and EU's involvements in minority protection in general cannot be grasped fully and adequately through isolating it from other European organisations' enterprises, i.e. that of the CoE and the OSCE. That is to say that the EU is not the only actor that has been playing a role in minority protection at the European level, but the CoE and the OSCE as well have been playing role in this field, not only so but also more actively and importantly than the EU (Toggenburg, 2008, s. 95) . The latter two organisations' endeavours concerning minority protection have been seriously taken into account by the former (Kymlicka, 2008, s. 13) . So, when considering the conditionality, all these institutions' engagements and efforts should be taken into account together.
Gabriel Togennburg (2004, s.5-6) demonstrates that EU's initial engagement in the issue at stake dated back to 1980s. According him, EU's interest in the subject emerged, first, from an internal initiative, that is, an (EU Parliament) attempt to determine a charter of rights for traditional minority groups existing in nine Member States then. However, this attempt-due to lack of constitutional or treaty basis in EU law at that time and lack of political consensus-failed. Notwithstanding this failure, the EU Parliament's attempt culminated in generating a growing political interest of the EU in protecting minorities with a number of policy tools devoted to this issue (Toggenburg, 2004, s. 6 ).
On the other hand, EU's main involvement in minority protection has been directly linked with its eastern enlargement (Toggenburg, 2004, s. 7) . This means that the first and the main policy developed by the EU on minority protection was motivated by its external relations. Therefore, the minority concern of the EU at large, which was initially applied through the policy of conditionality as of 1993, was a result of certain historical circumstances, that is, the collapse of eastern bloc countries. This account has been revealed fully and in-depth in the literature. It is, thus, not coincidental that since the conditionality was primarily adopted to be directed to the CEECs, a significant number of literatures on the conditionality have focused on minority matters with reference to the CEECs (See among others, Kochenov, 2007; Haughton, 2007; Hughes, 2003; Topidi, 2003; Pentassuglia, 2001 ).
Prior to the EU's initiative of introducing the conditionality however, there was another attempt -but from another European organisation, i.e. the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which later became the OSCE -to set up a minority protection tool in the European region. In its conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE held in Copenhagen on 29 June 1990, the CSCE adopted a document-known now as the Copenhagen Document or Principles-, which covered a large number of principles concerning human rights, democracy and rule of law. And a specific part of this Document High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) along with the mission offices in several post-communist countries in 1992. However, the most important step was the adoption of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (hereinafter Framework Convention) by the CoE in 1995 and its advisory bodies and reporting mechanism (Kymlicka, 2006, s. 37) . 7 This Convention provides for a large number of rights dedicated to national minorities existing in the CoE member states. 8 The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages adopted by the CoE too is another important legal tool dealing with minority languages.
In line with these developments -and before the adoption of Framework Convention, the EU (and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation-NATO) 9 acknowledged minority protection as a condition, first in 1991 (the above-mentioned Document on the recognition of new states) and then by introducing it into the Copenhagen political criteria in 1993 (Kymlicka, 2006, s. 36 ).
Looking at this briefly-summarized history of the EU conditionality, Kymlicka is of the view that the success of accommodation of minority protection (and rights) in western countries is a result of internal negotiations rather than external pressure. However, it does not mean that the external influence did not have any role in developing minority rights in western countries. Nevertheless, before the adoption of the Framework Convention, the term -national minorities-is said to be unknown to the Western countries (Kymlicka, 2006, s. 39) . What they tried to do in this period was to monitor the post-communist state, but in doing so, they did not have any proper conceptual tool to deal with their own minorities in the same manner they required from those post-communist countries (Kymlicka, 2006, s. 39 (Toggenburg, 2008, s. 95-96) . In this sense, it can be said that the underlying motivations have determined the scope and limits of the conditionality.
Underlying motivations of the conditionality
In order to understand the underlying motivations and rationales of why the EU adopted the conditionality as a criterion for the membership (and also why other European organisations have developed recommendations (the OSCE) or adopted an international convention and a language charter (CoE)), it is inevitable to refer to, among other things, early circumstances underwent in the post-communist era, and this helps understand the scope and limits of the conditionality stemming from this background (Sasse, 2008, s. 842) .
As said by Kymlicka (2006, s.36) , "the story begins with the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989." 11 After the communist regimes collapsed, the fear that communism would be replaced with ethnic conflicts or war in the European region became a widely-shared feeling at that time (Kymlicka, 2008, s. 12; Toggenburg, 2004, s. 7) . This fear that constituted one of the main motivations behind the adoption of the conditionality (Sasse, 2008, s. 847) emerged from the growing nationalism among ethnic groups, not only among minorities, but also among majorities (Preece, 1998, s. 3) . As serious ethnic conflictswhich occurred between Croats and Serbs and Bosnians, and which caused an ethnic cleansing-showed that this fear was not only a hypothetical, but the real one. It was increased by the stipulations of those post-communist countries, such as Hungary, Slovakia, 10 For example Krzysztof Drzewicki states that the primary mandate of the OSCE-HCNM is to attempt to prevent ethnic conflict before it comes out. Therefore, it does not extent to all minority related issues. (Drzewicki, 2008) these states towards their minorities increased that fear, accordingly the situations in these countries were considered as potentially dangerous, and regarded as a threat to the peace in the European region.
Kymlicka spells out some further motivations that underlie the conditionality. For example, he claims that one of the motivations of the European organisations, apart from the one expressed above, was to prevent the large number of refugees that had been assumed to arise from the ethnic conflicts within the post-communist countries. Another reason lied behind the adoption of the conditionality, he goes on, was to find out or measure how really those countries' political systems were ready and reached a maturity to become a member to these organisations, especially to the EU (and the NATO) (Kymlicka, 2008, s. 13-14) .
In this scene, the European organisations found themselves in a difficult situation and they believed that they had to do something to re-build and ensure the security and peace in the region. So, they adopted the above-mentioned measures on the protection of minorities to achieve this aim.
EU's internal concern with minority protection
In contrast to its initiatives described above, the EU initially did not set up a body or a mechanism. Nor did it adopt standards ascribed specifically to follow up the conditionality.
What the EU has opted for is that it has supported the works of the OSCE and the CoE on minority protection and it has forced the candidate post-communist countries to conform to the latter two organisations' standards and mechanisms (Kymlicka, 2006, s. 37) . This is mostly what the EU had assessed in the Progress Reports issued on the CEECs.
In this regard, despite the fact that EU's has contributed, albeit limited, to minority protection in European region through its external policy, this external policy initially was 12 See for some events that took place in these countries (Preece, 1998, s. 43-44) .
not reflected prominently to its internal affairs for the benefit of minorities existing in the EU Member States (Toggenburg, 2004, s. 4) . Although there have been various attempts to add minority protection tools to EU law, today there are only very loose and modest legal tools in the primary sources. In other words, there is no source which is, directly and in a farreaching manner, assigned to minority protection (De Witte, 2004, s. 110) .
The first source which concerns with the issue at stake is found in the Amsterdam
Treaty that entered into force on 1 May 1999. This Treaty re-introduced the criteria adopted Hughes argue that the EU abandoned the minority protection conditionality, since the binding legal text does not incorporate it (Hughes, 2003, s. 10-11) . However, this view seems not acceptable as the later developments have showed that the EU did not give up its concern with minority protection, which can be clearly seen in the Progress Reports issued for various countries during the accession process. Thus, the mentioned view is not accepted.
The Amsterdam Treaty conferred the competence on the EU to take necessary measures against discrimination on the base of, among other things, ethnic origin (Article 13 of the EC Treaty). This provision led to the adoption of two directives in 2000, known as Race
Equality (Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment between Persons irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin) and Employment Equality (Establishing a General Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation) Directives. These two European Council
Directives, especially the former one, under the provision of Article 13 EC are considered as the most relevant and strong tools of the EU law assigned, indirectly, to minority protection (De Witte, 2006, s. 146; Schutter, 2008, s. 236) .
Potential contributions of article 13 and of the two Directives to minority protection seem that they are confined to an indirect way in coping with the issue, in that they do not confer positive rights on minorities of member states, but aim to prevent discriminatory practices, with which minorities mostly face. 13 Despite their indirect way in dealing with the minority issue, the mentioned-sources should be considered as improvements in the sense that they have brought a growing concern of the EU with the issue.
In addition to article 13 EC Treaty, there are also two other articles, which are indirectly related with minority issues. In order to understand this loose or modest approach of the EU to minority protection, referring to some suggestions of a number of scholars from the literature will be enlightening; they also indicate possible future engagement of the EU in minority protection.
It is suggested in the literature that the EU should not opt for taking a more comprehensive and firm approach to the matter, because -as said above-the sensitive nature of the minority issues to some member states, like France and Greece, can provoke and even exacerbate the 'principled opposition of several member states' (De Witte, 2004, s. 123) . It is rather proposed that the EU should choose to cooperate closely with the CoE and the OSCE 14 In fact, there was also a reference to the same Charter in the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, but that Treaty or known as EU constitution could not been put into effect due to the refusals in the referendums by some member states, such as France and Netharlands.
15 Even though the Treaty of Lisbon is put into force, the way of formulating the provision of minority protection would probably not be interpreted-due to lack of political consensus-as it confers specific rights on minority groups existing in the EU member states (De Witte, 2006 s. 145 (Hofmann, 2004) .
Keeping in mind the preceding parts, we can now turn to the issue of the general limits of the EU conditionality, which comes out of the more macro view to the issue. In this account, Kymlicka's opinion is of high relevance and significance.
Limits of the Conditionality of Minority Protection
At the political level, the EU's involvement in the minority issues in general and the conditionality in particular seem to fall short of providing a general and far-reaching account on minority protection and rights. The limits of the EU's endeavours can be noticed from foregoing chapters. The controversial and politically problematic nature of minority matters significantly in these attempts, for some negative connotations has been attributed to it, like 'secession'.
For the EU, the limits undergoing in the political level concerning minority protection determines the legal limits as well. As mentioned, the EU does not still have an institutional competence in making legislations for harmonizing the area of minority rights, although there have been a number of sources in the primary sources of EU law. In this regard, what Kymlicka underlines concerning with the limits of European organisations' efforts on minority standards and mechanisms is very much illuminating and extremely important.
To start with, Kymlicka argues that there has been a growing tendency to develop minority protection standards in international as well as the European level for decades. This tendency is thought to be as a remedy of the Westphalian system of sovereign nation-states, which, for long, avoided (national) minorities. Although there is no homogenous and unique approach to the remedy, the states have shown their commitments to follow it-an accommodation of national minorities to the political unity in some degree, mainly under a tolerance-based system (Kymlicka, 2006, s. 35) .
Consistent with this, Kymlicka further argues that what the European organisations
(the EU, the CoE and the OSCE) advanced as the standards of minority protection at the outset was primarily influenced by the minority protection system of the League of Nations (Preece, 1998, s. 73) . 16 However, that system had only imposed 'unilateral obligations on the newly created states' (De Witte, 2000, s. 4). Furthermore, it had focused on protecting specific minorities in specific countries; therefore, it was not general in nature. Accordingly, it could not be a sufficient source for the European organisations to follow.
On the other hand, after the Second World War and under the auspices of the United Nations, there was not a general minority rights framework in international law applicable universally to all minorities, because minority rights in this era was approached and Article 27 of the ICCPR could somehow be used as guidance by the European organisations (Kymlicka, 2006, s. 40) . However, it could not have taken the European organisations forward, since it merely stresses on negative, non-interference rights, 18 which would not be enough for those minority groups as they were demanding more than negative rights, such as using their languages in the public services, which requires public funding for minority schools, universities and media, local or regional autonomy, right to political 16 See more on the minority protection system of League of Nations, (Preece, 1998, s. 67-94) .
17 See more on the characteristics of minority protection in post-Second World War period (Preece, 1998, s. 95-120) . 18 However, it should be mentioned that the approach that the Human Rights Committee holds with regard to article 27 makes this account disputable, in that the Human Rights Committee discusses that article 27 should be understood as it may lead to granting affirmative action policies or not. See on this account, (Scheinin, 2008) representation etc. In that sense, Kymlicka claims that in order for the European standards on minority rights to be a useful tool to solve those (real and potential) ethnic conflicts, they had to bring more; some positive rights rather than negative ones; article 27 thus would not be enough to solve these conflicts (Kymlicka, 2006, s. 40) .
Even though the standards developed mainly by the CoE and the OSCE go beyond the scope of article 27, they, however, failed when considering certain issues, such as claims relating to territorial autonomy, design of official language status etc. (Kymlicka, 2006, s. 43) .
Therefore, Kymlicka believes that the current level of minority protection standards of the European organisations is beyond to provide a tool which is necessary to give answers to the real or the core problem: the demand of autonomy or self-government of those ethnic groups.
Consistent with this, Kymlicka further claims that the European organisations have
been dealing with less controversial topics, such as cultural rights and political rights. By doing so, he goes on, the European organisations believe that if these two categories of rights are guaranteed by the states in the European region, then other more controversial matters can be overcome (Kymlicka, 2008, s. 11-12) .
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Therefore, instead of encouraging the idea of autonomy or self-government, according to Kymlicka, the European organisations have supported 'right to effective participation' among these two alternatives on minority protection or minority rights. The right to effective participation refers to the idea that minorities shall be able to participate in all public matters, especially in one which are closely of their concerns and/or which affect them (Kymlicka, 2008, s. 28-29) . By adopting this third way of minority protection, it is intended that radical demands of minority-primarily the right to self-determination-would be prevented. Its flexible and unclear nature seems to provide such kind of tool for modest state-minority relations, because the focus of the right to effective participation is on the non-discriminatory measures, such as equal right to vote and participation, right to run for office etc.
19 Preece uses almost the same arguments, (Preece, 1998, s. 3-13, s. 42-43) and also other chapters, According to Kymlicka, there might be different readings of the right to effective participation; therefore different outcomes may range from the loosest perception towards the robust one. It means that due to the flexible and modest nature of the right to effective participation, it might or would not affect the outcome of particular policies in which minority groups would be allowed to participate. More clearly, even though minority groups are allowed to participate in the political process, outcome of that process will not be different, because those policies would be subjected to be voted, and the majority will gain what it wants to adopt at the last resort. Therefore, in practice the effective character of this right is forgotten or put aside intentionally. In that sense, that practice might lead again to adopt another position which might require a more robust minority protection and power sharing between state and minority groups, which again would be likely rejected by the states (Kymlicka, 2008, s. 29-30) . Thus, here arises a dilemma, which, it seems, the conditionality cannot solve.
After having elaborated the general and particular limits of the conditionality, we can now turn to its application to Turkey. Here however, only some observations as seen in the Regular Progress Reports issued by the European Commission will be provided. This constitutes the actual paradigm of Turkey concerning the minority protection.
Application of the Conditionality to

General remarks
To start with, a few general aspects of the Reports and a number of remarks should be called attention. First of all, the information employed in these Reports concerning the compliance of Turkey with the Copenhagen criteria, including the conditionality of minority protection, has been collected from different sources including that of international organisations, such as the CoE and the OSCE and national and international NGOs. However, in some occasions, there is no direct reference to the sources, and when there is one, it is sometimes not easy to predict which sources were referred to and how they were assessed.
Therefore, the process of drawing up of the Reports and exploiting the information therein is not very transparent. Another point with regard to Reports is that the Commission has a loose approach in its policy of assessing and monitoring the conditionality, which stems from the lack of clear standards and benchmarks in EU law to measure the compliance. Some implications of this view can be seen in the language and structure preferences of the Commission observed in the Reports. For example, the term 'cultural rights' was removed from the sub-title of An operational definition could be helpful to determine which group will be identified as minority and thereby will be beneficiary of the protection and the rights granted thereupon. The most significant problem about this issue arises from whether existence of minorities in a state is a matter of subjective determination of that state or it is based on facts. The answer to this question provided by international law literature is the latter one, that is, the existence of minority in a country is a matter of fact. 22 This means that a state cannot subjectively determine whether it has minorities or not. The Commission's approach in this regard seems to be obscure one. If the Commission does not want to put itself in a position which might cause some problems in terms of politically sensitive nature of the issue, it could prefer referring to the relevant international documents or literature, but it has refrained doing so.
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Notwithstanding the problem about the definition of 'minority', what might be, in the view of the Commission, the characteristics of a group to be identified as minority was, to some extent, provided for in the Report of 2007. The Commission disclosed a statement 22 This view is endorsed by the Human Rights Committee under article 27 of the ICCPR. See (Scheinin, 2008, s. 25-26) . It is also endorsed by the ECtHR in the cases of Ahmet Sadik v. Greece in 1996 and Sidiropoulos and Others v. Greece in 1998 , quoted from (Thornberry, 2004 . 23 The definition of the term 'minority' is problematic not only for the EU, but also for the other international organisations dealing with minority rights, such as the CoE, the OSCE and the UN. In that sense, there has been as yet no legally binding definition of the term in international law, although there have been a number of attempts to provide one. These attempts are very well documented and summarised in (Pentassuglia, 2000) . The monograph summarises the attempts at providing a definition by the UN, the OSCE and the CoE pp. 1-10. See also for the summary of the definitions of those organisations including the League of Nations and also for scholarly discussion on definitions, (Preece, 1998, s. 14-29 Although this might seem to be compatible with the Commission's position, referring to language of cultural diversity, which the EU has exploited and paid more attention in the Reports since 2006, it is not difficult to predict that this very wide scope would not be agreed to by the Turkish state, when one thinks of its historical position. Needless to mention that migrant groups would not be included within this scope -since the Commission endorsed the idea that those who might be beneficiary of some specific rights need to be citizens of Turkey, although this issue has been discussed in the literature that whether or not migrant groups can be treated as minorities.
Concluding Remarks
To sum up, in this article, the EU conditionality is explained and discussed. It accompanied with some remarks concerning its application to Turkey. In first place, it is explored in what kind of circumstances the conditionality was formulated. Later, the rules that deal, mostly indirectly, with minority protection in EU law were summarized. After all, the some remarks on the application of the conditionality to Turkey were provided.
As explored above, the primary aim of the conditionality was to prevent ethnic conflicts in the European region, then to obtain and entrench security and peace. Therefore, this immediate aim laid down the limits and scope of the conditionality. Once this primary goal was accomplished, the EU moved to less problematic aspects of minority question and in that sense it introduced tools mostly dealing with anti-discrimination measures.
The account that Kymlicka argues for the limits of the endeavours of the European organisations on minority protection can be noticeable in the application of conditionality to
Turkey by the EU. The EU has been applying the conditionality to Turkey in a loose manner, even looser than the one applied to the CEECs.
Although the Turkey's accession process to the EU has brought some positive outcomes concerning human rights in general and minority rights in particular, the suspicion towards the issue prevents furthering the improvements. Nevertheless, it might be too early to predict at this moment whether the leverage of the EU's conditionality will lead to further solutions in this respect. Whether the leverage of the accession process to the EU will bring a real paradigm shift in Turkey's approach towards the minority groups remains as a challenge for the Turkish political actors in the short and medium term under the EU accession process. 
